Recently, some studies examined how downtown parking space limitation re-shapes the morning commute in the case of a single origin-destination network. This paper further formulates and analyses the commuting equilibrium problem of both mode and departure time choices in a bi-modal (auto and public transit) many-to-one network. Several properties of the equilibrium under parking space constraints and the proposed parking reservation system are discussed. Procedures for computing the dynamic user equilibrium with a parking space constraint (either trading of reservations is allowed or not) have been developed. We show that parking reservation can help reduce deadweight loss due to parking competition and roadway congestion. We also found that assigning more reservations to travelers from a specific origin does not necessarily reduce total travel cost of them, while doing so might raise the total travel cost of travelers from other origins. When parking supply is less than the potential demand but is relatively large, it is socially preferred to retain some parking spaces open for competition. However, when the total parking supply is relatively small, all parking spaces should be reserved to travelers. Besides, we show trading of reservations among travelers would yield an efficiency loss. This loss can be fairly large thus trading should be prohibited.
Introduction
Parking limitation in downtown areas is a growing problem for both commuters and traffic managers in large cities. Finding a parking space often constitutes an appreciable fraction of the total travel time (Shoup, 2006) . Glazer and Niskanen (1992) modelled the congestion caused by through-traffic and by traffic destined for the area where consumers park. Bifulco (1993) introduced parking fees and parking searching time in a stochastic user equilibrium assignment model for evaluation of different parking policies. Researchers have conducted a series of studies to analyze the interactions between cruising or searching for parking and traffic congestion (e.g., Arnott and Inci, 2010; Arnott and Rowse, 2009 ). Arnott et al. (1991) embedded the parking problem in the morning commute model (Vickrey, 1969) and showed that parking fees alone can be efficient in increasing social welfare, and a combination of road tolls and parking fees can yield the system optimum that maximizes social welfare. Under the parking setup by Arnott et al. (1991) , Zhang et al. (2008) derived the daily commuting pattern that combines both the morning and evening commutes, and investigated mechanisms and efficiencies of several road toll and parking fee regimes. Qian et al. (2012) investigated how parking fees and parking supply can be designed to help mitigate traffic congestion and reduce travel costs. Parking pricing has been advocated as an alternative of road pricing to help manage traffic (e.g., Fosgerau and de Palma, 2013) . For a recent review of parking studies, one may refer to Inci (2015) .
Recent studies (e.g., Qian et al., 2011; Habib et al., 2012) reported that parking availability can affect a commuter's trip plan, including departure time, mode and route choices. Zhang et al. (2011) showed that competition for limited parking spaces in the downtown would force travelers to depart from home earlier thus encounter larger schedule delay cost. Following the tradable travel credits proposed by Yang and Wang (2011) , they introduced a parking permit distribution and trading scheme to reduce the inefficiency due to parking competition. More recently, a series of studies (e.g., Yang et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014a) further investigated the morning commute problem with a binding parking space constraint, and proposed parking reservation to reduce total travel cost of travelers. While these studies provide some insights on impacts of competition for parking and develop strategies to improve traffic efficiency, they often focus on the problem in a simple dynamic network with one roadway bottleneck, and ignore the network-wide impacts of parking competition due to the parking space constraints.
This study looks at the commuting equilibrium problem of both mode and departure time choices with parking space constraints in a bi-modal many-to-one network. Under different network specifications, various aspects associated with parking have been analyzed in the literature, e.g., network with multiple parking facilities (Li, 2008; Lam et al., 2006; Qian and Rajagopal, 2015; He et al., 2015) ; parking information provision (Li et al., 2012; Qian and Rajagopal, 2014) ; park-and-ride service (Li et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014c ). In the current study, we focus on the bi-modal many-to-one network to explore the network-wide A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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-3 -impacts of parking competition. Note that this network specification might be more suitable for those cities whose urban structure presents a largely radiocentric layout, as considered in, e.g., Badia et al. (2014) .
In the considered network with multiple bi-modal traffic corridors, commuters live in several different residential areas (i.e., "many" origins), and every morning they travel to the same city center (i.e., "one" destination) through a corridor. Every traveler can choose to either drive and park in the downtown or take public transit without parking consideration. For commuters from different origins, they have competition for parking spaces in the downtown area, but do not share the same roadway and public transit thus there is no direct flow interaction among them. For commuters from the same origin, they not only compete for parking in the city center, but also share the same roadway and public transit. This treatment helps us to focus on the impacts of parking competition and allows for tractability, while it simplifies the modeling of traffic interaction. We then examine how these interactions among all travelers through parking competition, and the interactions among travelers from the same origin through shared highway and transit would re-shape the bi-modal commuting equilibrium in the context of multiple traffic corridors. Also, we will examine how the allocation of parking reservations among commuters from different origins would affect the morning commute equilibrium and help reduce the inefficiency caused by competition for parking and roadway congestion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the basic model formulation, and revisits the case of a one-to-one network that incorporates parking space constraints and parking reservations. In Section 3, the bi-modal many-to-one network with parking space constraints is introduced, and the commuting equilibrium without or with parking reservations in such a network is formulated and analyzed. Section 4 discusses the efficiency loss of the parking reservation system due to trading of reservations among commuters. Numerical studies are presented in Section 5 for illustration of the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.
Revisit the Bi-modal equilibrium in a one-to-one network
In this section, we will firstly present the formulation of travel cost functions of auto and transit modes. Then, the bi-modal commuting equilibrium without and with parking space constraints in a simple network with single origin-destination (O-D) will be revisited. Vickrey (1969) introduced the first bottleneck model of congestion dynamics. Smith (1984) and Daganzo (1985) further established existence and uniqueness of the time-dependent equilibrium distribution of arrivals at a single bottleneck respectively. Thanks to its analytical A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
Travel costs formulation
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-4 -tractability, the bottleneck model has been adopted to study various issues (e.g., Arnott et al., 1990; Laih, 1994; Liu et al., 2015a,b) . For recent comprehensive reviews of the bottleneck model, one may refer to, e.g., Small (2015) .
In the bottleneck model, travel cost by auto, including travel time cost and schedule delay cost, departing at time t can be expressed as () 
where () rt is the departure rate from home at time t . When there is no parking space constraint, given the total number of auto commuters a N , the equilibrium auto travel cost will be ( )
which is an increasing function of the number of auto commuters, a N .
In the bi-modal setting, travelers can either drive their car (auto mode) or take transit (transit mode). For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost of taking transit is an increasing function of the number of transit users, i.e.,
where t N is the number of transit users. Note that, () tt cN can be regarded as a reduced form of the transit cost function for a model in which transit users are subject to schedule delay costs, and have a time-of-use decision to make (Kraus and Yoshida, 2002; Kraus, 2003) . More complicated situations, e.g., when transit operator is responsive to parking supply or roadway capacity expansion (Zhang et al., 2014) , might be considered in further study.
Bi-modal equilibrium without and with parking space constraints
Denote the total number of commuters by N . Now we look at the case when parking supply in the city center is sufficient such that there is no parking space constraint. By assuming an A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t M , respectively. For commuters with reservations, their choices of departure time (from home) are not directly affected by parking availability; while for commuters without reservations, they have to either depart from home early enough to secure a parking space or take public transit to avoid parking competition. Hereinafter, we denote the commuters with reservation by r-commuter, the commuters without reservation but choosing auto mode (they have to depart from home early enough to secure parking spaces) by u-commuter, and the commuters taking transit by transit commuter. At the bi-modal equilibrium, travel cost of u-commuter will be identical to transit commuters, which is equal to
Define the following critical number for a given parking capacity M : 
For specific auto commuting equilibrium scenarios, one may refer to Yang et al. (2013) , where three general scenarios and two critical scenarios are discussed in more details. In this paper, we classify those scenarios into two categories: Category I when
and Category II when
, where m is defined by Eq.(5) for given M . For Category I, the arrivals (at destination) of commuters with reservations (rcommuter) and auto commuters without reservations (u-commuter) are completely separated. For Category II, some commuters with reservations (r-commuter) have to queue after the last commuters without reservations (u-commuter), thus the arrivals of this two kinds of commuters are not fully separated.
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t u-commuter) . This also means that travelers are willing to pay a price to obtain a parking reservation, which is also the motivation of our discussion on trading of reservations later in Section 4.
In addition, at equilibrium, the first and the last u-commuter will arrive at destination at time ( ) Evidently () t π is an increasing (but not strictly increasing) function. This function will be used in Section 3 for computing the equilibrium traffic pattern in the bi-modal many-to-one network.
The bi-modal many-to-one network with parking space constraints
Now we consider a bi-modal many-to-one network with n origins (i.e., "many") and the same destination D (i.e., "one") as shown in Figure 1 . Each origin-destination (O-D) pair is connected by a highway with bottleneck and a parallel public transit line with dedicated rightof-way. Note that there are some studies exploring the optimal dynamic traffic assignment and commuting equilibrium in queuing networks, e.g., Yang and Meng (1998) , Zhang and Zhang (2010) . In the bi-modal many-to-one network, commuters are living in different residential areas and they travel to the same city center every morning either by driving or taking transit. For commuters from different residential areas, they do not share the same highway or public transit, thus there is no direct flow interaction among them. However, as they travel to the same downtown with parking limitation, they have to compete with each other for parking spaces. For commuters living in the same origin, they not only compete with each other for parking, but also interact with each other at the shared highway and public transit.
In the many-to-one network depicted in Figure Total number of parking spaces available at the city center is M . O respectively. Without a parking space constraint, the commuting equilibria for different O-D pairs are independent of each other. Therefore, the combined equilibrium in the bi-modal many-to-one network will reduce to a simple summation of equilibrium without parking space constraint for the n O-D pairs. In this study, we will focus on the case with binding parking space constraints. A binding parking space constraint in the many-to-one network implies that
where , ai N is the potential auto demand or parking demand for traveler from the -th i origin i O . In this case, travelers from at least one origin will have to compete for the parking spaces.
The commuting equilibrium with parking space constraints in the bi-modal many-to-one network can be determined by a similar approach as that in Zhang et al. (2011) , with the help of Eq.(9) to determine the parking space ending time. Later we will present the procedure to compute the equilibrium in the many-to-one network with parking space constraints and parking reservations, which incorporates that in Zhang et al. (2011) as a special case.
Now we turn to the commuting equilibrium when parking reservations are introduced. Denote the allocation of reserved parking spaces (or parking reservations) among commuters from all iI ∈ , the auto commuting traffic pattern at equilibrium is just the same as that if there is no parking constraint, which is a limiting case of Category II. The travel costs in this case can still be calculated by using the formulations for Category II.
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To ease later analysis of the commuting equilibrium in the bi-modal many-to-one network, we now summarize several facts about the latest arrival time of the u-commuters defined in Eq. (8) Proposition 1. At equilibrium, i) for
In Proposition 1, the results in (i) and (iii) are straightforward. 
System performance with parking reservations
Given the allocation of reservations among commuters of different O-D pairs, r M , the total travel cost of all commuters at equilibrium can be written as
where for all iI ∈ , 
for l al
for a 0l l
Now we consider the case when all parking space are reserved to commuters, i.e., (17) and (18) . Under its optimal solution * r M , total travel cost should be no less than that by solving Eq. (15) under constraints in Eqs. (16) A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t is also worth mentioning that assigning more reservations to commuters from one specific origin, while might increase total travel cost of commuters from other origins (as stated in Proposition 3), will not necessarily reduce the total travel cost of commuters from this origin. This will be discussed in the following.
We examine the specific allocation A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t M by a small amount. In the following Proposition 5, we provide a stronger condition for further intuition. Before doing so, we define
for any iI ∈ . 
it is socially preferable to retain some parking spaces open for competition. ii) Furthermore, for any iI ∈ , if ( ) A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 
is likely to be negative, indicating that it is unlikely to reduce travel cost by maintaining some public parking spaces. This is verified in numerical studies.
Efficiency loss due to trading of reservations among commuters
One-to-one network case
Now we consider the case where commuters can trade their parking reservations (without consideration of transaction cost). It is similar with tradable parking permit considered in Zhang et al. (2011 ), Liu et al., (2014b . Firstly, we look at the case of a one-to-one network. Under a parking space constraint, a reserved parking space would yield a travel cost saving, i.e., r at PP < , where t P is the transit travel cost and r a P is the travel cost of r-commuters, which is discussed in Section 2.2. Thus, travelers would be willing to pay a price no larger than r ta PP − to obtain a parking reservation. Indeed, given the total number of reservations r M , the equilibrium price of a parking reservation should be exactly equal to the cost saving from traveling with a reservation, which is
For the one-to-one network case, given parking capacity M , the transit cost t P is constantly equal to ( ) P even if the equilibrium belongs to Category II (due to the network-wide interaction among travelers through parking competition). Then, the price (value) of a reservation for travelers of O-D i will not be a constant. This is also briefly discussed in the following section.
Many-to-one network case
In the many-to-one network, the parking reservations might be traded among commuters from different origins. In this case, as the total number of reservations This means that, travelers from these origins will benefit from selling out their reservations (if some reservations are assigned to them at the initial reservation distribution) even they have to compete for parking or take transit; and if they do not have a reservation, they will not buy from the market as the reservations are too expensive for them, i.e., the price of a reservation is greater than the cost saving associated with the reservation.
As discussed in Section 4.1, in a one-to-one network, the price of reservation is constant 
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 
The trading equilibrium determined by Eqs. (41) and (42) usually deviates from Condition Eq. (40). This means that trading of reservation among travelers will probably lead to nonoptimal allocation of reservations among travelers from a system perspective. This is later verified in numerical studies.
At the joint equilibrium of travel and trading, Eqs. (41) and Eq. (42) should hold in addition to the traffic equilibrium conditions. By taking the advantage of the Procedure I in Section 3.1, we then propose the heuristic (Procedure II) to compute the joint equilibrium. In Procedure II,
Step 0 computes the traffic equilibrium given the current r M , and
Step 1 adjusts r M in the direction to satisfy conditions for trading equilibrium.
Procedure II: Computing the User Equilibrium with Trading
Initialization:
Input Use Procedure I to compute the traffic equilibrium. Set 1 k = .
Step 1: Step 2:
, stop, and let
Otherwise, let
, and 1 kk =+, then go to Step 1-0. 
Numerical study
In this section, we will present some numerical analysis to illustrate the essential ideas in the paper. In our analysis, following Liu et al. (2015b) , the value of time and schedule delay penalties are: 9.91 (EUR$/hour) α= , 4.66 (EUR$/hour) β = , 14.48 (EUR$/hour) γ = .
Two-to-one case
Firstly, we look at the two-to-one case, and we take the symmetric case as a benchmark, where Figure 3(a) shows that the four ratios increase if we increase the travel demand 2 N . This indicates that if there is more travel demand from origin 2, the cost saving (value or price) of a reservation is higher, more commuters will choose to drive without reservation (however, it is upper bounded by 1000, and tt , and if we increase the roadway capacity 2 s , and if we increase fixed transit cost 0,2 c . By decreasing 2 t , increasing 2 s , and increasing 0,2 c , it means for commuters from origin 2, driving becomes more attractive (either driving becomes less costly or taking transit becomes more costly). As a result, the cost saving (value or price) of a reservation is higher, more commuters will choose to drive without reservation, total number of drivers (with or without reservation) increases, and the potential parking demand increases. Figure 3 (b) shows that the increasing rate of these four ratios are decreasing as () A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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-24 -is under the blue dotted line (for non-trading equilibrium). Furthermore, the price of reservation at the trading equilibrium is higher than the average price at the non-trading equilibrium (the red dashed line is above the blue dashed line), indicating averagely the cost saving through a reservation is higher in the trading equilibrium case. Note: All costs TC are in EUR$ Table 1 summarizes the parameters of O-D pair 2 for the examples in Figure 5 while those of O-D pair 1 are identical to the benchmark case. In Table 1 ,
( )
TC UE is the total travel cost when reservation is not introduced, which corresponds to the point (0,0) in Figure 5 ; and ( ) TC SO is the total travel cost when the optimal allocation is introduced given the parking capacity, which corresponds to the star-marked point in Figure 5 ; and ( ) TC UET is the total travel cost when total number of reservations is identical to that under ( ) TC SO , but we allow travelers to trade, which corresponds to the circle-marked point in Figure 5 ; and ( ) TC SOB is the minimum total travel cost can be achieved (congestion at highway is eliminated, the joint Figure 5 .
We also note that, the combination of , as one can see in Table 1  (43437 and 41031 for UET while 43178 and 40864 for SO). However, if the two O-D pairs become more asymmetric, the efficiency will be even larger. Later in the five-to-one network example, we will show the efficiency loss due to trading can be fairly large.
In Table 1 ,
is the ratio of travel cost reduction by the reservation system to the maximum travel cost reduction (the maximum potential), given the current travel demand, parking capacity, highway capacity and transit cost. We can see the reservation system is quite efficient, as in Table 1 is larger for cases with smaller parking capacity. This is because, when parking capacity is smaller, the costly schedule delays due to competition for parking, which are the major inefficiencies, can be sharply reduced through reservation. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
Five-to-one example
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-27 -Now we present a numerical example of a five-to-one network for further insights. Table 2 summarizes characteristics for each O-D pair in such a network. Table 3 further presents the results of the five-to-one network in nine situations. In Table 3 , OUE corresponds to the case without parking spaces constraints, and UE corresponds to the case without reservation introduced (but with a parking space constraint), and SO is the case with optimal allocation of reservations among O-D pairs. When total number of reservations is equal to that for SO, UEP is the case that the numbers of reservations assigned to each O-D pair are proportional to their potential demands, and UET is when trading of reservations is allowed. Note that UE(1), SO(1), UEP(1) and UET(1) are for the case with 4880 M = , while UE(2), SO(2), UEP(2) and UET(2) are for the case with 2000 M = .
In Table 3 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t Table 2 . In this case, O-D pair 5 then belongs to group 3. The current allocation of reservation assigns quite a lot reservations to commuters of this O-D pair, and those without reservation can always obtain a public parking space before the ending time as discussed in Section 3.1. Similarly, in the situation of UE (1), O-D pair 4 belongs to group 3. Given the parking allocation, for commuters from O-D pairs belong to group 3, the parking space constraint is not binding for them. Therefore, the travel cost of those with and without reservation is identical, which is shown in the fourth row of Table 3 , and the value of a reservation is zero, which is shown in the third row. Figure 6 shows convergence of the proposed Procedure I and Procedure II in the two-to-one example. Figure 6 (a) depicts the errors defined in Procedure I and Procedure II for computing traffic equilibrium (without trading), i.e., ( ) lel τ−τ τ , and for computing joint equilibrium of travel and trading, i.e., depicts how the prices of reservation and public parking space ending time evolve over iteration.
Convergence of Procedure I and Procedure II
(a) Errors against iteration (b) Prices of reservation and ending time Figure 6 . Convergence of the proposed Procedures I and II Note that when computing the joint equilibrium of travel and trading, in each iteration, we have to run Procedure I to compute the traffic equilibrium. Thus, there would be one error curve for ending time (red dashed line in Figure 6 (a)) and curves of ending time (red dashed line in Figure 6(b) ). In Figure 6 , we choose only one as an illustrative example. The values in Figure  6 (b) are normalized through being divided by the final solution, so that all the curves approaches 1 after certain numbers of iterations.
6.
Concluding remarks In this paper we examine how the binding parking capacity constraints re-shape the rush-hour traffic patterns in a bi-modal many-to-one network. Several properties of the commuting equilibrium with parking space constraints and parking reservation are discussed. Procedures for computing the dynamic user equilibrium with a parking space constraint (either trading of reservations is allowed or not) have been proposed.
Particularly, we show that parking reservation system can help reduce deadweight loss due to parking competition and roadway congestion. Furthermore, it is shown that assigning more reservations to travelers from a specific origin does not necessarily reduce total travel cost of them, while doing so can lead to an increase in travel cost of travelers from other origins. Our analysis also indicates that when parking supply is less than the potential demand but relatively large, it is socially preferred to retain some parking spaces open for competition. This is because, by retaining public parking spaces, we indeed separate departures and arrivals of those with and without reservations. Thus, traffic congestion is temporally relieved. However, when the total parking supply is relatively small, all parking spaces should be reserved to travelers to avoid costly competition for parking.
We also show that trading of reservations among travelers can yield an efficiency loss. As shown in the numerical example, this loss is less when the characteristics of all the O-D pairs are more similar. However, as shown in the five-to-one network example, the loss of efficiency can be up to 16%, thus trading should be prohibited. However, when the loss due to trading is relatively small, we may allow people to trade as prohibiting trading can be costly in practice.
While the current study adopts a network with multiple independent traffic corridors, further study may consider a linear corridor with multiple origins and one destination as in Tian et al. (2007) . In this case, if we only consider single bottleneck congestion at the end of the corridor, the model would be very similar to the one-to-one traffic corridor case discussed in Section 2 and Yang et al. (2013) (the difference is that, commuters from different origins along the corridor will have different free-flow travel times). However, if we incorporate dynamic traffic congestion along the corridor as Arnott and de Palma (2011) , the problem would be much more challenging, which is one of our priorities for future research. We may also analyze the impacts of limited parking in a general multi-modal network. We expect similar trends as those in this study even for a general network with more complex traffic dynamics. This is because, the qualitative impacts of parking limitation and parking reservation will not change, i.e., parking limitation forces people to travel earlier or shift to public transport; parking reservation offers flexibility in mode and departure time choices.
The current paper considers all the travelers as regular morning commuters. Future study may take into account two classes of travelers: regular and occasional commuters. In this case, parking operators might be more willing to provide parking reservation services to the regular A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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-32 -customers (e.g., by charging less). We will explore how to set the differentiated reservation prices, and efficiently allocate the reservations among these two classes of travelers. Besides considering prices of parking, we may also link parking duration with scheduling of daily work activities, morning-evening commutes such as that considered in Zhang et al. (2005) .
